1 The verbalness of a dispute is certainly a reason to bring the dispute to a halt, and would seem, prima facie, to be a reason to take all the sides to be on equal footing as far as the facts are concerned. So, if we came to conclude that ontological disputes were one and all verbal, we might understandably conclude that ontology is silly, a waste of time. It therefore behooves ontologists to take a hard look at the best arguments for conciliatory conclusions. And that is the aim of this paper.
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to retract a judgment about the behavior of falling bodies under the impact of new information, we should other things being equal presume that the original assertion was false. This is the barest description of the Hirsch criterion. One might raise certain objections to it if it were put forth as an account of what it is for a dispute to be verbal. 6 But these objections, while interesting in their own right, seem irrelevant to the dialectic. All Hirsch strictly needs to secure
Step 1 is the assurance that when the criterion is used on the relevant ontological disputes its satisfaction (more precisely, the satisfaction of its right-hand-side) would suffice for the dispute to be verbal. And it is not easy to show that he lacks this assurance. 7 Nevertheless, Hirsch thinks his criterion requires modification because of a point made by Tyler Burge (1979) . Burge influentially argued that one's meaning is determined in part by the patterns of usage within one's linguistic community, at least so long as one's usage isn't too deviant. 8 So, for ontological disputes in which none of the sides' usage is deviant, their meanings will be the communal meanings, and so, absent ambiguity or context-shifts, they will not all be speaking truly. Hirsch seems to think that the disputes over persistence and composition fall into this category. Suppose he is right. Suppose, for example, that the perdurantists speak falsely using English. Is Hirsch's criterion satisfied for the perdurantist/endurantist dispute? Should the endurantists interpret the perdurantists as speaking truly in their own language? The endurantists can be as well-informed as one likes and so can be assumed not to rely on empirical mistakes in interpreting the perdurantists. So, assuming the correct norms of interpretation do not lead the endurantists to make mistakes about the perdurantists' meanings, the endurantists ought to take the perdurantists to be speaking English, and so to be speaking falsely. So it looks like Hirsch's criterion won't be satisfied! The endurantists ought not interpret the perdurantists as speaking the truth in their own language.
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Hirsch insists we shouldn't take the Burge point to prove that there are no verbal disputes in which one side speaks deviantly. If you claim, "drinking glasses are cups" and I demur, our dispute is probably verbal, even though, in keeping with Burge's point, one of the sides is speaking truly and ought to interpret the other side as speaking falsely. For Hirsch (2005, 69) , the Burge point merely shows that some further tinkering is necessary to fix his criterion.
The chosen tinkering is to reinterpret the phrase "in one's own language." If speaking the truth in one's own language isn't the same as speaking truly using the language one speaks, what is it? To answer this question Hirsch turns to hypothetical linguistic communities. The key idea is to assess the truth of side X's assertions not in the language side X actually speaks (the communal language) but in the language which would be spoken by an imagined linguistic community relative to which members of X, speaking as they in fact do, speak nondeviantly. To put it vividly: one hypothetically alters the Xs' surrounding community in minimal ways so as to make the Xs' actual patterns of speech nondeviant relative to that community; then one determines whether the sentences members of X assert are true in the language spoken by that hypothetical community (2005, 69-70).
So Hirsch responds to the Burge point by stipulating the following meaning for the phrase 'that side's own language' used in his criterion. Side X's own language, or X-English, is the language spoken by the X-community, i.e., the hypothetical community whose normal members, as Hirsch says, talk like side X. Hirsch (2005, 88) clearly thinks that the X-community will persistently speak like members of X both in the philosophy room and everywhere else.
This is an assumption we will question later on (see §2.2), but in the meantime I will not challenge it.
6
With a basic understanding of Hirsch's criterion under our belts we turn to the argument that the composition dispute satisfies this criterion. 9 
§1.2. The argument that the composition dispute satisfies Hirsch's criterion
In the dispute over composition there are a number of sides including Nihilism (composition never takes place), Universalism (composition always takes place), Organicism (composition takes place when some things' collective activity constitutes a life), and what I will call
Commonsensism, (composition takes place just enough to make sure there are living things, artifacts, and inanimate objects answering to most concrete count nouns in English which ordinary English speakers regularly apply in normal contexts). There are other sides, but these will suffice. We'll call the proponents of these sides the Ns, Us, Os, and Cs. To keep things as simple as possible we will idealize a bit by supposing that all sides assert the following sentences:
• Every physical object is ultimately composed of simples.
• Simples are point-sized, or at least extremely small.
We will make two further suppositions. We suppose first that the sides do not dispute the truthvalue of any sentence that they all agree is only about simples and their interrelations. And we suppose second that all four sides assert:
• Where some xs compose a thing y, it is not the case that y is identical to the xs, and so composition is not identity.
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Actual Ns, Os, and Cs standardly do assert this. 11 The same is true also of many of leading Us (e.g., Lewis, Sider, Hudson, and Rea 12 ). In any case, I doubt Hirsch would want to say that if the sides in the composition dispute denied the thesis that composition is identity their dispute would be substantive! Given that the sides assert all these claims, we can determine much of what each will assert and deny. The Ns will assert 'there are simples, but no trees, rocks, or tables', etc. The Os will assert 'there are simples and trees, but no rocks or tables'. And so on.
Now we turn to the argument that Hirsch's criterion is satisfied by this dispute, i.e., that each side in the dispute ought to conclude that the other sides speak the truth in their respective languages. I will give a sketch of how the argument goes.
First, imagine that you are interpreting a community which talks like one of the sides in the dispute with a "smaller ontology" than yours. 13 For definiteness, imagine you are a C field is free of bumps' before we begin a soccer game, you might insist "Well, strictly speaking, it isn't. The bumps are just relatively small." I concede: "well, okay."). But recall that the members of the O-community, according to Hirsch, are not willing to make these concessions in such contexts. They do not just happen to be in contexts in which the restriction to simples and living things is appropriate; their language precludes them from "talking like" Cs, or Us, etc.
Given the way the O-community is characterized, the hypothesis of semantic rather than mere contextual quantifier restriction is to be preferred. 19 Turn now to the case in which you accept a "smaller ontology" than another side in the composition dispute. How should you interpret the communities that talk like this other side?
Imagine you are an O interpreting the C-community. When members of this community see some simples arranged tablewise they assert 'there is a Os face a number of hard interpretative questions whichever of these schemes they use.
Suppose they use the pluralizing scheme. Then they must ask whether the C-community always uses grammatically singular quantifiers and predicates to express plural quantification and plural
properties. When members of the C-community assert 'there is a tree over there', the Os do not seem to be barred from interpreting them as saying simply that there is a tree over there. Is 'there is' ambiguous in C-English? The Os would have to ask why that would be, and whether the postulation of ambiguity is borne out by the linguistic dispositions of the C-community.
Similar questions arise if the Os use the counterfactual scheme on the C-community. They must ask whether the members of this community always mean something were Commonsensism true by 'something', even when they say 'there is a tree here'. If not, are their quantifiers ambiguous? 21 Questions also arise about the C-community's use of names. Perhaps, as Cian Dorr (2005, suggests, the Os can take names they regard as empty (e.g., 'Mars') to express in C-English certain properties of properties (e.g., the property of being a property that would be instantiated by the fourth planet in the solar system were Commonsensism true). This interpretation will allow them to conclude, charitably, that 'Mars is a planet' is true in C-English.
But then Os will have to ask themselves whether all names in C-English express properties of properties. And it will be hard for them to answer yes if they think that names in their own language don't express properties of properties. Suppose the Os think their name 'George Bush' has as its semantic value, not a property of properties, but the man himself -certainly a 11 defensible view. It will then be hard for the Os to resist drawing the same conclusion about 'George Bush' in the C-community, given the remarkable similarity between (or even the identity of) the Os' use of that name and the C-community's use. 22 replies, "there's no mountain there." So, it seems that if you follow Hirsch's argument through you'll conclude that O-English simply doesn't allow one to refer to a great many highly visible objects. And if one cannot refer to them, one cannot predicate of them any of the vast range of properties which they possess. This is a severe expressive limitation. 25 It might be thought that this argument is too quick. The O-community does assert apparently plural sentences when in the presence of tables. properties at all to non-living composites, let alone properties they possess. The most the sentences make possible is the predication of properties tables don't possess to non-tables.
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The O-community also asserts the likes of 'were Commonsensism true and everything otherwise were as it actually is, the thing that the cat is sitting on is a 28 I will not go through the argument. It is unnecessary in any case. Our result about the sides using the larger ontologies is enough by itself for us to raise difficult questions for Hirsch.
Thus, we can make an interesting observation. Any side using the quantifier-restricting scheme will have to take the language of the sides with the smaller ontologies to be expressively deficient. The deficiency is in no way recherché. The facts which can't be expressed, in the opinion of the interpreting sides, will be plain-Jane perceptually available facts. Their inexpressibility is therefore very puzzling. So puzzling, I think, that one might begin to doubt whether Hirsch's recommended interpretation scheme really is charitable. For, presumably, part of the principle of charity is charity to expressibility. If a fact is plainly observable by simple perception, there is a strong defeasible presumption that people very much like oneself in their perceptual and conceptual abilities shouldn't be precluded from expressing that fact by their native language. Hirsch is effectively recommending that we sacrifice charity to expressibility to preserve charity to perception and charity to understanding. All this is to say that Hirsch's argument is questionable on the very sort of grounds he appeals to. 29 A side note. Sacrificing charity to expressibility leads to another problem. 30 Let me explain. First, note that for each Hirsch-recommended interpretation scheme there is a corresponding translation scheme which pairs sentences asserted by side X in the composition dispute with sentences asserted by side Y. Thus, we can speak of the translation scheme the Cs use on the Os, and vice versa. As noted, the Cs will think that O-English is expressively deficient because it does not allow predications of any properties to nonliving composites. Now, consider the Cs' attitude toward Os' translations of their (the Cs') assertions. The Cs assert 'there are tables'. Whatever the O-translation is, the Cs will reasonably regard it as inadequate on the grounds that O-English washes out all information about nonliving compositesinformation which is expressed in their assertion. Similarly, the Os will think C-translations of their distinctive claims -e.g., 'there are no tables' -are inadequate, because the Os think that CEnglish precludes, by dint of semantic rule, the expression of a large body of negative information. Thus, if the sides follow Hirsch's advice, then they can be quite confident that they will not be able to resolve their dispute in a conciliatory resolution. They might quit arguing, but they cannot reasonably make the claim, distinctive of a conciliatory resolution: "I understand Returning to the main point. When the sides in the composition dispute consider how to interpret the other sides' community, they face a conflict of charity. Charity to expressibility strongly pulls in one direction, whereas other subsidiary principles of charity pull in another direction. I think it is simply unclear what to say about how the sides should interpret the other sides' corresponding communities.
§2.2. Characterizing the "corresponding communities"
Given our conclusions in the previous section, perhaps we should take a closer look at the role the communities were supposed to play in Hirsch's argument for verbalness. Hirsch's reason for invoking the imaginary communities was to sidestep the Burge point. We were told that the members of these communities "talk like" the corresponding actual ontologists. The members of an X-community must "talk like" actual Xs in whatever ways are necessary to make the Xs' speech non-deviant relative to that of the X-community. In section §2.2, though, I argued that given the role the corresponding communities play, they should be understood not as unphilosophical X-counterparts but as persistent philosophers.
Understood in that way, I argued that the sides do not violate charity to perception, understanding, etc. in any serious way by taking the other sides' communities, like themselves, to be speaking English, whereas they commit a serious violation of charity to expressibility by following Hirsch's conciliatory recommendations. Now, the sides presumably know that if the other sides' communities speak English, then at most one of the sides can be speaking the truth in its side's language (absent ambiguity or appropriate difference in context of speech). Thus, I
concluded that Hirsch's own criterion for verbal disputes, if correct, can be used to show that the composition dispute is nonverbal.
So, in short, the objection is this. First, if we understand the sides' communities in Hirsch's preferred way (as unphilosophical X-counterparts), his argument for verbalness is problematic, since it ignores a certain important conflict of charity. Second, we shouldn't understand the communities in this way, and once we understand the communities properly we can see that Hirsch's own criterion provides good reason for thinking the dispute is nonverbal. Consider an example. Let P-English be a version of English in which the quantifiers are semantically restricted to non-planets. 41 Speakers of P-English assert 'There are no planets'.
Suppose Ursula, a speaker of the language Hirsch would call U-English, encounters Paul, a speaker of P-English. Ursula asserts 'there are planets'. Now this dispute would seem to satisfy The main point needn't be put into the mouth of a revisionary ontologist. In order to secure the conclusion that the English-speaking side wins, Hirsch needs to give us good reason to think that English is not expressively deficient in relation to the languages of the other sides. He has not done this.
There are other ways in which the revisionist side might fare better than a common sense side, even if the dispute is verbal. The language of the revisionist side might associate key ontological expressions with more eligible or natural properties (if that distinction can be made out) or associate them with more theoretically useful properties. 42 There seem to be a number of ways in one side can have a leg up on another side even if the dispute is verbal. Thus, in order to derive the conclusion that the commonsense side wins from the premise that the relevant dispute is verbal, Hirsch needs to show that none of these ways are available for the revisionary sides.
Perhaps it is not particularly helpful to speak of winning a verbal dispute. But we can still compare the ways the sides' speak -the associated languages -with respect to various factors. Even if the composition is dispute is verbal, some revisionary side, e.g., universalism, might be associated with a better language. If so, there will be reasons for the parties of the 27 dispute to speak the way Universalists speak when doing ontology. If certain facts can only be captured by speaking that way, or if nature's joints are better carved that way, or if the ontological notions one would employ are more theoretically useful, then far from dismissing the Universalist's claims, we should talk start talking like her for purposes of describing and understanding reality.
§5. Limited Conciliation
Even if the composition dispute is not verbal, I want to suggest that the sides can arrive at a kind of limited conciliation through charitable interpretation of one another. This suggestion further bolsters my claim that each side can charitably interpret the other side to be speaking English.
First, each side ought to conclude that, while the other side has false beliefs about composition and about what exists, a great many of the (false) sentences they assert are still "factual." 43 The intuitive idea here is that each side will claim that there are real facts which all but ground the other side's assertions, and that these facts fail to ground the assertions only because the other side's ontological position is false. We can make a first stab at defining factuality as follows: a sentence S is factual relative to an ontological position A iff S has a factuality-maker relative to A, that is, iff there are real facts which, given A, would ground S's truth. If there is a unique minimal condition satisfaction of which is sufficient for the existence of a factuality-maker for S relative to A, this condition could be thought of as the factuality condition for S relative to A. The quantifier-restricting and the pluralizing schemes discussed above might therefore be thought of as specifying factuality conditions rather than truth conditions or meanings. The Os will grant that 'there are tables' is factual relative to Commonsensism, because the factuality condition specified by 'there are some things arranged tablewise' obtains. The Cs can return the favor, granting that 'there are no tables' is factual relative to Organicism, because the factuality condition specified by 'there are no simple-orliving things arranged tablewise' obtains. Thus, by seeing the other sides as making factual claims (relative to their positions), the sides in the composition dispute can see the other sides'
claims as rooted in fact, and not merely forming a consistent theory which fails to make contact with reality. 44 Second, each side in the composition dispute ought to regard the other as "capturing," in a certain expanded sense, a wide range of facts. The relevant sense of "capturing" a target fact is not that of accepting it, but rather accepting either it or some fact(s) which ground(s) it. Thus, the Cs can see the Os as capturing not only facts about simples and living things but also facts about the existence and character of tables, mountains, and other non-living composites. This is because Cs will see the latter facts as grounded by facts that the Os accept. Thus, e.g., while the Os reject the fact that there are tables, they accept a ground for it, namely the fact specified by Then it seems that all that these philosophers can be disagreeing about is whether the language we speak is in fact the first imagined language (Lockean English) or the second
He of course claims that we speak the first language, and therefore that the Lockean wins the dispute. 4 In none of the papers in which the Hirsch strategy is clearly at work is Hirsch focused exclusively or squarely on the composition dispute. In Hirsch (2005) he is occupied with a very general dispute over "physical object I have chosen to focus on the composition dispute because it is a dispute over one question (unlike the DL/RC/EH dispute), which is easily formulated (arguably unlike the question whether endurantism or perdurantism, or neither, is true), and which is the subject of continuing controversy (unlike the debate over mereological essentialism). That said, I think my objections to
Step 1 for the composition dispute can be revised to apply to Step 1 for any of these disputes.
I would therefore define a verbal dispute as follows: It is a dispute in which, given the correct view of linguistic interpretation, each party will agree that the other party speaks the truth in its own language.
as well as one in Hirsch 2007a:
The disagreement between mereological essentialists, four-dimensionalists, and defenders of common sense is, on my view, merely verbalmerely a matter of language -in the following sense: Each side can charitably interpret each other side's position in terms of a language in which all of the other side's assertions come out true.
And it is presupposed in crucial passages of Hirsch 2005. For example:
Hence, four-dimensionalists ought to conclude that, on the most plausibly charitable interpretation of RC-English, all of Chisholm's disputed assertions are true in that language (77).
6 Peter Markie raises the following objection. What one ought to conclude about whether someone speaks the truth depends on one's available evidence about how that person speaks, and one's evidence could be extremely slender or downright misleading. The fact that I ought to conclude, based on misleading evidence, that you speak the truth in your language, and that you ought to conclude the same of me, based on your misleading evidence, does not establish that our dispute is verbal. 7 In the ontological disputes at issue, the disputing sides possess such a comprehensive and coherent body of evidence about how the other sides speak so as to make it very improbable that the canons of correct interpretation, There is room in logical space for denying composition-as-identity so understood without accepting the claim I highlight in the text, i.e., that for any xs and any y, it's not the case that y is identical to the xs. However, once we bear in mind our tacit assumption that the 'y' is restricted to physical objects (as opposed to sets, set-like sums, or masses of stuff), the two claims seem to stand or fall together. 11 Arguably they are committed to asserting it. For general considerations of plausibility provide reason to think that composition as identity is true only if universalism is true. Suppose composition is identity. Now consider the claim of universalism: for any xs, there is a y which they compose. Given composition as identity, this amounts to the claim that for any xs, there is a y with which the xs are identical. It is hard to see how there could be a thing with which, say, the ws are identical but no thing with which the zs are identical. For one thing, what could possibly explain this difference between the ws and the zs? More decisively, if some things can be one thing, and this is genuine identity, the very relation which holds between a thing and itself, then this relation should have all the characteristic features of identity. Just as for any thing x there is something y with which it is identical, so for any xs there should be some y with which the xs are identical, and so by composition as identity there should be some y the xs compose. Thus, we arrive at universalism. 12 Of course, Lewis and Sider do think that composition is importantly analogous to identity. But I am using 'composition as identity' to pick out the strong thesis that to compose a thing just is to be identical to that thing. 13 The four sides are orderable with respect to face-value ontological commitment. The Us appear to accept more objects than the Cs, the Cs more than the Os, the Os more than the Ns.
14 Like Hirsch, I ignore possible worries about speaker vs. semantic meaning. 15 This is an instance of what Hirsch calls quantifier variance. There are distinct meanings for quantifiers in different languages. 16 I presume that Hirsch advises the sides with larger ontologies to interpret the other sides' communities as speaking languages whose quantifiers, in all contexts, are subject to a domain restriction to the common entities. rather than the world of utterance (i.e., worlds considered as actual). But I put these matters aside.
33 21 A referee points out that the postulation of ambiguity doesn't fit well with standard tests for ambiguity. The Cs are prepared to assert 'there is an F and a G over there' whenever they assert both 'there is an F over there' and 'there is a G over there', even when F is 'tree' and G is 'cat'. 22 Justin McBrayer noted that the idea that use determines meaning sits poorly with claiming that the Cs and the Os associate differently meanings with names of living things, e.g., 'George Bush'. 23 One might object that even if the Os see some of their names as having objects as semantic values they can't see all of their names as having such semantic values, because they have plenty of what they regard as empty names:
'Big Ben', 'Mt. Hood', etc. However, the Os clearly treat these differently than other names. The worry is that the Cs don't seem to treat 'Bush' and 'Mt. Hood' differently. nonliving composites but only at the cost of being unable to predicate of them properties that they possess. 26 If, per the previous note, Cs understood O-English to contain a semantic restriction on predicates rather than quantifiers, there would be a corresponding problem: although O-English would allow singular and plural reference to nonliving composites, it wouldn't allow the predication of properties these entities have. The properties predicated would all require that the things which have them be simple-or-living. 27 Hirsch is aware of a tension between his conciliatory position and certain conceptions of facts. He writes:
…I am inclined to agree with Putnam that, once we've accepted quantifier variance, there is no point in trying to hold onto language-shaped facts that are in the world independent of language. However, we can retain the notion of an unstructured fact. (2002, 59) There is no need for me to contest this point. All I have been arguing is that the Cs will reasonably believe that there is a large range of structured facts that O-English can't express. Or if you prefer to do without the word 'fact', my point can be stated this way: the Cs will reasonably believe that is a large range of things the properties of which its favored notion, causation*, even if not expressed by 'causes' in English, better serves the same theoretical and practical purposes causation serves, e.g., by removing relativity to human norms (see Beebee 2004) . Or consider Joshua Knobe's (forthcoming) claim that intentional action exhibits a praise/blame asymmetry (roughly, if φing is clearly wrong then knowing that by doing what you're doing you φ is enough for intentionally φing; whereas this is not the case if φing is merely good (but not obligatory)). If Knobe is right about intentional action it doesn't follow that the other side loses. Perhaps there is more theoretical and practical utility in a morally neutral notion which is otherwise like that of intentional action. Similarly, we would need to ask whether there is reason to think that, supposing the disputes over composition and persistence are verbal, the relevant existence and composition notions employed by the sides in the composition dispute are of equal utility and importance. If existence* or composition* scores higher than existence or composition, on these measures, a case could be made that the side employing these notions wins a more important dispute than the dispute over who is speaking English. (Perhaps this last thought embodies an error because of the special status of existence and composition, but that has to be shown rather than assumed.) 43 Sider ( 44 One might wonder why we couldn't appeal to factuality in characterizing translation schemes for the sides in the composition dispute. Why couldn't we say that the translation the Os' use on the Cs for S -i.e., T O (S) -is 'S has a factuality-maker relative to Organicese'? and similarly for the Cs' to use on the Os? But the problems with expressibility come up here, too. Both sides, if they use these schemes, will see the other side's language as expressively deficient relative to their own. 45 For further discussion and development of the notion of factuality, see McGrath (2005) . Interesting questions arise concerning whether sides with larger ontologies can see sides with smaller ones as capturing singular facts about objects they deny. Can the Cs see the Os as capturing singular facts about tables? The Cs will think they can, it seems, only if they think that all singular facts about tables are grounded. This is a delicate matter. It is not obvious that anything could ground a singular fact of the form y is F, where Fness is a basic property (i.e., a property the instantiation of which by an object isn't grounded in facts about that object). For any y, the fact y exists might be like this. But could facts about the parts or constituents of y -facts of the form the xs are arranged soground the fact y exists? This is far from clear. If not, it looks like the Cs will have to take the Os as not capturing
